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SUMMARY
Nord (2011) criticizes standard arguments which assert that consistency requires that future health benefits must be
discounted at the same rate as future costs in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). He suggests these arguments are misguided
because they require transitivity of preferences across decision contexts and that it can be appropriate to discount health at
different rates depending on the programs to be compared. I claim that rejecting transitivity is unwarranted and would
sharply diminish the utility of CEA. Factors that tempt Nord to reject consistency can be accommodated by recognizing
that CEA does not perfectly mimic normative social preferences because it omits factors (like distribution of health in a
population) that can be normatively significant. A better approach is to maintain consistency in application of CEA but
authorize decision makers to depart from rankings implied by CEA when justified and to explain which specific factors
justify the decision. Finally, the assertion that health must be discounted at the same rate as costs requires the additional
assumption that the dollar value of health does not change over time, a point that is not always recognized in standard
arguments. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Erik Nord (2011) criticizes ‘consistency arguments’ that are often invoked to argue that future health benefits
(typically measured in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs)) should be discounted at the same rate as future
costs (measured in dollars or other monetary units). He writes that these arguments assume ‘transitivity in pref-
erences across decision contexts in which different considerations are invoked’ and suggests that it may be
appropriate to discount health at different rates depending on ‘the comparator in question’ (p. 19).
I believe this rejection of transitivity lies at the heart of the disagreement between Nord and the authors
of the consistency arguments he criticizes. Many health economists believe that social preferences should be
transitive across a larger set of decision contexts than Nord suggests and reject his claim that the rate at which
health benefits are discounted should depend on the specific programs that are compared.
The stronger claim that consistency requires health to be discounted at the same rate as costs depends on an
additional condition that is not always specified and is not normatively required: that the monetary value of
health increments (the threshold value used to determine whether an intervention is cost-effective) does not
change over time.
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The resolution of this disagreement has important implications for the use of cost-effectiveness analysis
(CEA). In my view, CEA is useful to the extent that it helps rank programs in accord with normative social
preferences (defined as the preferences society should have, even if they are not always respected).1 As I
discuss later, CEA should not be treated as an inviolable decision rule because it does not incorporate all factors
that are normatively significant. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) are intended to quantify the
efficiency with which resources can be converted into health through specific programs. If this measure of
efficiency is not normatively significant, what is the purpose of computing it?
Cost-effectiveness analysis can mimic only transitive preferences. This follows because ICERs are
real numbers and the equality and inequality relations (i.e., >, ≥, = ≤, <) applied to real numbers are
transitive.
If normative social preferences are transitive across a wide range of decision contexts, then CEA can provide
guidance for a correspondingly broad set of decisions. In this case, it can be extremely useful to conduct CEAs,
to catalog them as in the CEA Registry (www.cearegistry.org) and to make them comparable across contexts
(e.g., by measuring ‘health’ in QALYs rather than more natural units such as cases of particular diseases, by
estimating QALY weights using a standard method such as the EQ-5D rather than study-specific methods,
or by following the specification of the Washington panel’s ‘reference case,’ Gold et al., 1996). Alternatively,
if transitivity across a significant range of decision contexts is not normatively required, then CEA is likely to
be much less useful and there is an urgent need to determine which decision contexts evoke sufficiently
‘different considerations’ that transitivity is not normatively required and hence CEA results may mislead
decision makers.
Consider Nord’s programs X, Y, Z, and W and the corresponding ICERs (compared with no program)
displayed in the following table (in Nord’s paper, T=10). Each program incurs costs (‘C’ or ‘C/(1+r)T’) and
provides health benefits (H) in the indicated years. Let s and d be the rates at which costs and health are dis-
counted, respectively, and let r be the relevant interest rate, for example, the rate at which the government
can shift resources between years 0 and T by increasing or retiring debt.
Program Year 0 Year T ICER
X C, H C/H
Y C, H [C/(1+s)T]/[H/(1+d)T]
Z C H C/[H/(1+d)T]
W C/(1+r)T H [C/(1+r)T]/[H/(1+d)T]
Nord suggests that it is plausible for society to be simultaneously indifferent between the following pairs of
policies:
X and Y (start-time neutrality) (1)
X and Z (benefit-time neutrality) (2)
Y and W (opportunity-cost of resources).2 (3)
The conditions under which the programs in each pair have equal ICERs are:
d = s (health discounted at same rate as costs) (1’)
d = 0 (health discounted at rate 0) (2’)
s = r (costs discounted at interest rate). (3’)
These conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously except in the unusual case that the interest rate r
is zero.
1If CEA is viewed as providing normative guidance, its methods are not invalidated by evidence that individuals or institutions make deci-
sions that conflict with its findings (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). If it does not provide normative guidance, what purpose does it
serve?
2Indifference between Y and W arises from the assumption that W could be achieved by paying in advance for program Y; that is, investing
the amount [C/(1+r)T] in year 0 to yield the amount C in year T then spending this amount on program Y.
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Nord notes that the preferences specified in (1), (2), and (3) cannot be represented using CEA and a common
discount rate for health. He suggests that the rate at which health benefits are discounted may depend on the
decision context. Specifically, in comparing X with Y, ‘discounting from program start times to present time
is not really necessary’ but if discounting is applied, ‘the rate will depend on start time differences.’ In compar-
ing X with Z, ‘the discount rate for benefits . . . will depend on benefit time preferences and need not be
consistent with the discount rate’ used when comparing X with Y (p. 19).3
Nord argues that discounting health at different rates depending on whether X is compared with Y or with Z
should not ‘lead to inconsistency and confusion’ for two reasons. First, ‘prioritizing in health care normally has
to do with distributing current resources,’ which implies the choice between X and Y is rarely confronted.
Second, when comparing X with Z, consideration of the potential beneficiaries’ ‘need comes into play’
(p. 19). I address each reason in turn.
In response to the first point, although it may be true that the bureaucracies that manage government health
systems must decide how to spend their exogenously determined budgets each year and cannot shift budgetary
amounts between years, other decision makers do confront choices about allocating resources to health in
different time periods and CEA can provide them with useful guidance. Legislators and treasury officials de-
termine the annual budgets of government health-care systems and do shift budgetary costs through time (e.g.,
by borrowing or retiring debt). In addition, CEA has been advocated and is in some cases required for evalu-
ating environmental, health, and safety regulations (e.g., US Office of Management and Budget, 2003). These
regulations require firms and consumers to spend their resources to promote health. In this application, there is
no fixed budget against which costs are assessed and the start time of the regulation is a government choice.
In response to the second point, CEA is a method that can provide useful guidance but it is unlikely to rank
health programs perfectly in accord with normative social preferences. This follows because normative social
preferences can depend on factors in addition to the consequences that are incorporated in CEA, such as the
distribution of consequences among individuals. As a consequence, CEA should not be treated as an inviolable
decision rule. Rather, decision makers should depart from the ranking implied by CEA when they judge it to be
appropriate, but should justify the departure by explaining which additional factors are critical and why they are
sufficiently important to justify the departure.
Nord suggests that a sufficient reason for indifference between programs X and Z (that provide benefits
at different dates) is that potential beneficiaries ‘are equally much in need of intervention now, even if the
benefits occur at different times’ (p. 19). He suggests that the implications of this factor can be accommo-
dated by using different health-discount rates so that the resulting ICERs reflect normative social prefer-
ences. In my view, there are better approaches. First, if ‘need of intervention’ is a property that can be
quantified, associated with specific times, and incorporated in either the numerator or denominator of an
ICER, it should be. If not, it should be treated like other normatively significant factors that are not incor-
porated in CEA, that is, it should be a reason for departing from a CEA-based ranking in cases where it is
judged sufficiently important.
Explicit acknowledgment of factors that influence normative social preferences but are not included in CEA
is critical to evaluating programs. Indeed, failure to recognize the normatively significant difference between
the beneficiaries of programs Z and W explains Nord’s ‘paradoxical result that X . . . is equivalent to both
Z and W, even though W is clearly preferable to Z’ (p. 18). Programs W and Y are equivalent in the sense that
they provide the same benefits to the same beneficiaries. But program Z is not equivalent to W and Y because
its beneficiaries are different and are judged to be ‘equally much in need of intervention now, even if the
benefits occur at different times.’ The symbol ‘H’ in program Z does not represent the same benefits as the
3Nord introduces the concepts of start-time difference and benefit-time difference. Conventional CEA associates each consequence (cost or
benefit) with the time it is realized. In his examples, start-time differences are equivalent to differences in when costs are incurred, but ‘start
time’ suggests something different (if a program provides benefits sooner than costs, would start time and benefit time coincide?). When a
decision (commitment) is made can be important in contexts where circumstances or information may change (there can be an option value
to postponing decision). Without a more explicit definition of ‘start time,’ the implications of adopting the new terminology are not clear.
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symbol ‘H’ in programs W and Y and hence it does not follow that ‘W is clearly preferable to Z.’ Nor is it
necessary to reject transitivity of preferences. The proposed indifference between X and Z is described
more clearly by recognizing the normative significance of beneficiaries’ need as a significant factor
additional to the timing of benefits; the indifference between X and Z does not reflect pure ‘benefit-time
neutrality’ (p. 18).
Although I argue that the discount rates used in CEA should not depend on which programs are being
compared, that does not imply that health should be discounted at the same rate as costs. That stronger
claim depends on the additional requirement that preferences exhibit start-time neutrality, or more gener-
ally that the rate of trade-off between costs and health within a period (the threshold ICER at which
an intervention is judged ‘cost-effective’ or what Nord calls the ‘dollar value of health,’ p. 24) does
not change over time (cf. Gravelle and Smith, 2001). A plausible alternative assumption is that the dollar
value of health should increase over time (assuming society becomes richer in material goods). In that
case, it would be appropriate to use larger threshold values in evaluating future programs and to discount
health at a smaller rate than costs (including zero and possibly negative rates).4 When comparing current
and future programs like X and Y, there are three rates of concern (the discount rate for costs, the discount rate
for health, and the rate at which the dollar value of health changes between year 0 and year T) but only two
degrees of freedom. Assuming that ICERs are to represent transitive preferences, these rates are mutually
dependent: given the values of any two, the value of the third is determined.5 Consistency arguments that imply
health should be discounted at the same rate as costs assume a constant dollar value of health without always
acknowledging it.
In summary, CEA is a normative tool that can provide important guidance in choosing among health
programs. It can be used in a broad set of decision contexts, including choices about coverage of preven-
tative and treatment services by government health systems within and between periods and about re-
gulations that require firms or individuals to spend resources to reduce health risks. By associating ICERs
with programs and appropriate comparators and using consistent methods (that do not depend on the
specific programs compared), CEA necessarily yields a transitive ranking. When factors not included
in the ICER are sufficiently important that an alternative with a larger ICER is normatively socially
preferred, that can be accommodated by making decision makers responsible to choose the socially
preferred option and to explain which specific factors justify departure from the ranking provided by
CEA. It is not necessary to limit use of CEA to ‘decision contexts in which [no] different considerations
are invoked’ (p. 19).
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